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In this dissertation, the author intends to make crucial implications to both theory and practice by
extending and combining theories from literature on corporate reputation, status shifts, celebrity, 
performance feedback and expectations of market analysts, and exploration/exploitation. Study 1 is a 
conceptual work that lays the foundation for the second study of this dissertation. The main premise of 
this study is that due to its path-dependent nature, corporate reputation may be a promoter of stability
initiatives and at the same time a demoter of change initiatives. 
In study 2, how corporate reputation may have a significant effect on the investment decisions of the  
firm is investigated. Using a panel dataset of 128 firms from various industries, our results from this study 
show that higher levels of reputation encourage the firm to embark upon more low-risk investments
and less high-risk investments. 
Finally, in study 3, the effect of status loss on the exploration/exploitation behavior of the organization
is examined. Using data on soccer teams in the English context in a 10 year period, we found evidence  
on the positive effect of status loss on the exploration behavior of the organization relative to its 
exploitative behavior.
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Social approval assets as a distinct set of intangible assets have been the focus of an 
important stream of research (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun, 1996). Social approval assets 
are particularly distinguished from other intangible assets since they are rooted in the 
collective perceptions of stakeholders (Bitektine, 2011; Lange & Washburn, 2012). In that 
sense, social approval assets are derived from social judgements of stakeholders (Mishina, 
Block, & Mannor, 2012). Such social judgements are mainly formed via either one or both 
sociocognitive processes of deliberate and analytical judgement on the one hand, and 
intuitive and affective evaluation on the other hand (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). For instance, 
in research regarding legitimacy, as one of the prominent social approval assets, it has been 
often cited that legitimacy is mostly derived from deliberate and analytical evaluations of 
stakeholders of the organization's conformity to the social values and norms that are 
considered appropriate (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Reputation has been also cited as a 
social approval asset that is mostly shaped through deliberate and analytical processes of 
evaluation (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, & Reger, 2017). Celebrity however 
has been considered as a social approval asset that is basically derived from affective 
responses of stakeholders towards the organization (Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; 
Zavyalova et al., 2017). On the other hand, status has been considered as a social approval 
asset that is rooted in both analytical and intuitive judgements of stakeholders, as status is 
affectively created based on the admiration and prestige of the organization in the minds of 
its stakeholders, and yet is deliberately shaped in comparison to other competitors and via 
an analytical ranking system (Podolny, 1993). 
Possessing social approval assets, such as having a good reputation or occupying a 
high social status, has been identified as a source of competitive advantage for 
organizations (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). It has been argued in the literature on social 
approval assets that the socially-favored organization, be it highly reputable or with a high 
status, will benefit from a number of financial and non-financial perks that are basically the 
positive outcomes of the organization's better bargaining power against its stakeholders 
and also compared to its competitors (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Podolny, 2010; Weigelt 
& Camerer, 1988). Such benefits include the ability of the organization in employing high-
quality employees (Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010), better access to financial resources 
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(Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005), better performance (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002), and the possibility of charging premium prices (Rindova et al., 2005).  
Furthermore, the importance of corporate reputation for the organization is also 
derived from the fact that reputation as an important social judgment, creates a crucial 
gauge for the stakeholders of the organization in making inferences about the 
organization's capabilities, qualities, and future behavior when more specific information is 
either impossible or difficult and costly to obtain (Mishina et al., 2012). In that sense, in 
the absence of concrete information organizational reputation mitigates the uncertainty of 
stakeholders by rendering a reliable idea of what the outcome of their interaction with the 
organization might look like (Stiglitz, 2000). Consequently, stakeholders would make 
informed decisions and embark on transactions and interactions with the organization 
confidently. They do so , for instance, by making their buying and selling decisions, their 
investing decisions, and their employment decisions (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999).  
At the same time, the importance of status in granting resources and opportunities to 
its possessor has been greatly discussed and investigated in the literature (Nippa, 2011). A 
higher status, as the hierarchical position that a social actor occupies within a social system 
(Gould, 2002), is beneficial for the organization as market resources and opportunities are 
not equally disseminated among organizations. Instead, they are disproportionally 
distributed in favor of organizations with higher statuses (Blau, 1994). This unbalanced 
distribution of opportunities and perks result in the desirability of being positioned in the 
top of the status hierarchy for the organizations (Jensen & Kim, 2015). 
As we can detect from the aforementioned discussion though, in terms of the 
outcomes of having a better social approval asset such as a better reputation or a higher 
status, the dominant perspective in the existing literature is mainly driven by the resource-
based view towards the organization and its social approval assets. The premise of the 
resource-based view is that an organization's success depends on the assets and capabilities 
that it possesses (Wernerfelt, 1984). The resource-based view goes a step further and posits 
that intangible assets are particularly important for their role in the success of the 
organization via granting it a sustainable competitive advantage as intangible assets are 
considered to be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Galbreath, 2005). In that 
sense, current studies on the organizational effects of corporate reputation and status, as 
two prominent social approval assets, merely look at them as "valuable resources" that 
give the organization competitive advantages and mainly superior financial performance 
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(Rindove et al., 2005; Galbreath, 2005). Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present summaries of major 
studies on the organizational outcomes of reputation and status, and depict their key 
findings related to the resource-based view.  
Table 1.1 An overview of major studies on the organizational outcomes of 
reputation
Article Key findings
Milgrom & Roberts (1982) Reputation provides protection against market entrants
Shapiro (1982) Seller’s reputation increases sales
Gatewood, Gowan, & 
Lautenschlager (1993)
Reputation increases the attractiveness of the firm for 
prospective employees
Chu & Chu (1994) reputation leads to higher profits
Ju Choi & Kim (1996) Reputation acts as a substitute for quality
Benjamin & Podolny 
(1999)
Reputation has a positive effect on charging premium 
prices
Deephouse (2000) Reputation has a positive effect on return on assets
Shane & Cable (2002) Reputation increases the attractiveness of the firm for 
prospective funding sources
Roberts & Dowling (2002) Reputation has a positive effect on organizations' ability to 
sustain above average profits over time
3
Such a dominant resource-based view towards the outcomes of social approval assets 
however overlooks their possible behavioral effects on the organization. The importance of 
investigating the behavioral outcomes of social approval assets would become more 
critical when we consider the fact that being evaluated as favorable by stakeholders might 
Turban & Cable (2003) Organizations with better reputations attract more and 
higher quality applicants
Boyd, Bergh, & Ketchen 
(2010)
Reputation has a direct positive effect on prominence and 
indirect positive effect on price premium
Table 1.1 An overview of major studies on the organizational outcomes of 
reputation
Key findingsArticle
Table 1.2 An overview of major studies on the organizational outcomes of status
Article Key findings
Benjamin & Podolny 
(1999); Roberts & Reagans 
(2011)
High-status organizations can charge a premium for the 
same quality output
Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan 
(1996)
High- status organizations experience greater sales growth 
for the same demonstration of quality
Phillips & Zuckerman 
(2001)
Status lowers labor costs
Jensen (2008) Status lowers barriers to entry into new markets
Stuart & Ding (2006) Status improves access to financial capital
Baum & Oliver (1992); 
Park & Podolny (2000)
Status increases an organization’s likelihood of survival
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affect the strategic decision making of the organization, which could have serious 
implications. For instance, Bundy and Pfarrer (2015) argue that upon the occurrence of a 
crisis, an organization with higher levels of social approval assets may be more inclined to 
embark upon accommodative strategic decisions and less favorably disposed toward 
defensive strategic decisions. Such an effect of social approval assets in return will be 
interpreted by stakeholders as mismatched over-conformity of the organization in 
accepting responsibility for a crisis that may have its roots in the situational attributes, and 
therefore opposes stakeholders' prior positive perceptions of the organization (Bundy & 
Pfarrer, 2015).  
Furthermore, in recent years, there have been few attempts on addressing other 
possible undesirable behavioral outcomes of "being socially-favored". For instance, 
Mishina, Dykes, Block, and Pollock (2010) have pinpointed how high-performing and 
prominent firms could be involved in illegal actions as a result of the pressure of their 
inflated internal aspirations and the environment’s external expectations. In another study, 
Jensen and Kim (2015) have studied how a sudden positive shift in the status of 
individuals could lead to negative outcomes, such as higher divorce rates, for them. Rhee 
and Haunschild (2006) studied how high-reputation organizations suffer more negative 
reactions from their stakeholders after the occurrence of a negative event such as a product 
recall. Even then, our understanding of the behavioral outcomes of social approval assets is 
limited and could be extended in three major areas. First, there is a need to investigate the 
effect of social approval assets on the decision making of organizations. On the contrary to 
few recent attempts on examining the influence of social approval assets on individuals' 
behavior, our understanding of such effects on the organizational level is very limited. 
Second, as social approval assets could suddenly and unexpectedly change, there is a need 
to break through the dominant static view towards social approval assets and examine how 
their shifts and dynamics might affect organizations' decisions and behavior (George, 
Dahlander, Graffin, & Sim, 2016). Third, there are multiple social approval assets to an 
organization, such as reputation, status, and celebrity, that are simultaneously in play and 
may affect the decisions of the organization both separately and jointly. This is an 
important premise to take into consideration as various social approval assets are rooted in 
different evaluation processes. In principle, social evaluators engage in two kinds of 
cognitive processing to assess social entities and organizations (Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The first type, deliberate processing, mainly involves 
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analytical reasoning of evaluators based on concrete decision rules, and hence is a slow 
process that takes time and effort to take shape (Bazerman, 2006). Legitimacy and 
reputation are among social approval assets that have deep roots in this type of cognitive 
processing (Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011; Tost, 2011). The second type, intuitive processing, 
mostly involves affective reasoning of evaluators based on loosely defined decision rules, 
and hence is a fast process that takes little time and effort to be created (Bundy & Pfarrer, 
2015; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Celebrity is a social approval asset that is created 
based on this type of cognitive processing (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Status on the other hand, is 
a social approval asset that is shaped based on the combination of both cognitive processes 
as it is based on the admiration and respect of stakeholders toward an organization, and yet 
is created in comparison to other competitors. Therefore, there is a need in the studies 
related to social approval assets to investigate how multiple social approval assets of an 
organization might jointly affect its outcomes.  
In this dissertation, I attempted on bridging those gaps in the literature by investigating 
the effects of social approval assets and their shifts on the behavior and decision making of 
the organization. I was particularly interested in the stability-change interplay, as the 
dichotomous behavior of the organization that could be impacted by social approval assets 
to a great extent. As many social approval assets, and reputation and status in particular, 
are shaped around the concepts of consistency and path-dependence, organizations with 
higher levels of such social approval assets would naturally face a dilemma in regard to 
stability and change. Reputation of an organization is based on the stakeholders' 
assessment of "what the organization can do and what the organization would likely 
do" (Mishina et al., 2012). In that sense, reputation is deeply connected with the past 
actions and behaviors of the organization and its ability to consistently show such 
behaviors over time (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 1983). On the other hand, 
organizational status is created by the path-dependent prestige and deference that is 
attributed to an organization (Marr & Thau, 2014). Since both social approval assets are 
formed and maintained based on the organization's past behaviors and consistency in 
repeating them, considering the fact that organizations often need to deal with decisions 
that require them to change the status quo (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003), it is important to 
investigate how such social approval assets could affect the decision making of the 
organization when facing a stability-change dilemma. To that end, I argue that reputation 
and status are the organizational constructs that are tightly coupled with the interplay 
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between change and status quo, having critical implications for the organization. To that 
purpose, I tackled the following research question in this dissertation: 
How do social approval assets of the organization (i.e., reputation and status) and 
their possible changes over time affect the organization's strategic decision making related 
to stability and change? 
By investigating this research question, I aim to make four distinct contributions to the 
current literature. First, in my dissertation I intend to make a general contribution to the 
literature on social approval assets and a specific contribution to the corporate reputation 
literature by theorizing and empirically investigating the behavioral outcomes of reputation 
for the organization. There are numerous studies on the benefits of possessing social 
approval assets, and having a high reputation as a prominent social approval asset, as a 
source of competitive advantage for the organization (Tables 1.1. & 1.2 present a summary 
of the major studies in regard to the benefits of reputation and status for the organization). 
The main premise of such studies though is their resource-based view toward social 
approval assets and the consequent assumption that social approval assets are resources 
that the organization could possess and benefit from. At the same time, there is a growing 
stream of studies on organizational reputation that believe in high reputation as a source of 
certain burdens and dangers for the organization (e.g., Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). There 
are however not concrete theoretical explanations for how reputation could become such 
burdens for the organizations. In this dissertation however, by arguing that higher degrees 
of reputation have certain behavioral consequences for the organization, I intend to 
contribute to that line of theory and provide a better understanding of the underlying 
mechanism that may affect reputable organizations in their decision making. Building my 
initial arguments upon theories pertinent to path-dependence and expectancy violations, I 
argue that due to the deep roots of reputation in the past performance and behavior of the 
organization and the fact that reputation is created and maintained through consistent 
adhering of the organization to the past-driven expectations of stakeholders, reputation 
may be considered as a behavioral compass that hinders the organization from breaking 
through the status quo and embarking upon change initiatives. Complementing this line of 
thought, I further on build upon the self regulatory focus theory and argue that reputation 
may bring a prevention-focus upon the organization, and by doing so, prevent it from 
taking part in risky initiatives that are related to change and exploration. The arguments 
and findings related to this line of thought present an important contribution to our 
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understanding of social approval assets as behavioral regulators for organizations, and 
inform us on its underlying theoretical mechanism.   
Second, I aim to make another distinct contribution to the literature on social approval 
assets by going beyond the general assumption that social approval assets are static and 
will not change over time. This is specifically a timely contribution to the recent call of 
studies on social approval assets for such an investigation (e.g., George, Dahlander, 
Graffin, & Sim, 2016). Organizations that are better endowed with social approval assets 
are believed to benefit from their advantages continuously and maintain their positions in 
the high levels of social evaluations hierarchy. Nevertheless, recently we have witnessed a 
growing trend in organizations going through negative shifts in their social evaluations 
such as negative shifts in their status. For instance, in the aftermath of the recent financial 
crisis in the late 2000's, we witnessed the fall from grace in many cases such as in the case 
of Lehman Brothers, which clearly lost their status. Such cases are evidences of the notion 
that social approval assets, and status in specific, are not stable and therefore could change 
over time (George et al., 2016). Nevertheless, our current understanding of such changes in 
social approval assets and their behavioral consequences for organizations is very limited. 
Keeping with that line of argument, I intend to contribute to the literature on social 
approval assets in general, and to the status literature in specific, by theorizing on the 
changes in social approval assets and investigating the effect of a negative shift on the 
decision making of the organization. To that purpose, I make use of behavioral theory of 
the firm and performance feedback theory to show how a self-threat such as a status loss 
may encourage the organization to break through its status quo and embark upon change 
and exploration. Hence, I intend to contribute to the literature on social approval assets by 
positing that they actually could change and have behavioral effects on the organizations' 
decision making. 
Third, I intend to make a crucial contribution in the confluence of theories related to 
self-affirmation, self-enhancement and psychological effects of social approval assets. In 
the aftermath of a threatening event, organizations attempt on enhancing and affirming 
their identity by seeking affirmation and approval from various sources (George et al., 
2016; Lange et al., 2011). The created affirmation and approval in turn may influence the 
decision making and strategic behavior of the organization. How such affirmation and 
approval sources and their possible changes may interact with each other and how 
organizations interpret and make sense of them and consequently take them into 
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consideration in their decision making however haven't been addressed in the literature. 
Using self-affirmation and self enhancement theories and their underlying theoretical 
foundations, in this dissertation I attempt on extending our understanding of how various 
social approval assets of an organization and their shifts may provide the organization with 
different self-affirmation cues, and jointly affect the organization's self-view and 
consequently its decision making and behavior. 
Fourth, in this dissertation I intend to make an important contribution to the stability-
change literature. Research on the antecedents of organizational decision making related to 
stability and change has remained limited to the investigation of structural and resource-
based factors (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). In this dissertation however, by positing that 
social approval assets and their probable shifts over time, via both direct and interaction 
effects, may also affect the organization's decision making related to stability and change, I 
attempt on extending the current understanding by rendering a behavioral and 
psychological perspective toward the antecedents of stability and change interplay.  
Theoretical Background 
Social approval and social approval assets 
Organizations are subject to various assessments by their stakeholders, which 
influence the relationship between them and consequently affect the organizations' 
strategies and operations (George et al., 2016). Social approval as the perception of 
stakeholders targeted at the organization is defined as "evaluators' general affinity toward 
an organization" (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). This general affinity could be a benefit and a 
burden for the organization at the same time. As stakeholders identify better with the 
organizations that they have a stronger affinity toward (i.e., socially approve to a greater 
extent), stakeholders are willing to prioritize those organizations over other competitors 
and associate with them by their endorsement decisions (e.g., the purchase decision of 
customers, the investment decision of investors, the employment decision of applicants, 
etc.) (Lange et al., 2011). Such endorsements give the organization the opportunity to build 
and maintain good relationships with its stakeholders, and consequently benefit from the 
financial and non-financial outcomes of such a good relationship, and eventually the 
competitive advantages that come afterwards (Roberts & Dowling, 2002).  
That being said, the advantages of being socially approved are mainly present and 
valid in ordinary times when the organization is operating and acting according to the 
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expectations of its stakeholders, and could become a burden when the organization violates 
from those expectations (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard, 2016). The burden of 
social approval is particularly evident when the organization faces a crisis such as a public 
scandal or a product recall. As the occurrence of a crisis is interpreted by stakeholders as a 
breach of trust and opposes their initial certainty in their interacting with the organization, 
its negative repercussion for the socially approved organization would be intensified and 
widespread (Coombs, 2007; Roberts, Madsen, & Desai, 2007). Therefore, it is important to 
investigate how social approval assets and their possible changes could affect the 
organization and its decision making. 
Corporate reputation 
Despite its simple definition, corporate reputation has been a point of interest and 
various interpretations in the literature. That's the reason that corporate reputation has been 
described in the literature as an organizational construct that is simple yet intricate at the 
same time (Lange et al., 2011). The dispersed definitions of reputation in the literature 
might give the audience the impression that reputation has been interpreted differently by 
various scholars. However, Lange et al. (2011) made an important conclusion in their 
invaluable review of the reputation literature stating that all those definitions could be 
classified under three categories, altogether shaping the 3 dimensions of corporate 
reputation as a multi-dimensional construct. "Being known" is the first dimension of 
reputation and those definitions that define reputation as the general awareness of the 
organization fall under this dimension (Barnett, Jermier, & Lafferty, 2006). Some scholars 
such as Rindova et al. (2005) call this dimension as "prominence" and define it as the 
extent of the organization's recognition among its various stakeholder groups. This 
dimension of reputation has been described as the general awareness and perception of 
stakeholders without any particular judgement or assessment (Barnett et al., 2006; 
Bromley, 2000).  
There are some other definitions of reputation that fall under the second 
conceptualization of reputation, namely "being known for something". Fischer and Reuber 
(2007) have described this dimension of reputation as "an assessment of a particular 
attribute or characteristic". In that sense, an organization could have reputation for a 
specific attribute such as high quality products (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). This 
dimension of reputation has been labeled as "perceived quality" by scholars such as 
Rindova et al. (2005), defined as the assessment of an organization by its stakeholders on a 
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particular attribute. As it is evident in the mentioned definitions, on the contrary to the first 
dimension of reputation, this dimension contains a certain judgement towards the 
organization and its abilities in demonstrating particular attributes in a certain manner 
(Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Love & Kraatz, 2009). 
Finally, the third dimension of reputation, conceptualized as "generalized 
favorability", contains those definitions in the literature that refer to reputation as the 
general esteem and attractiveness of the organization among its general audience (Barnett 
et al., 2006). Unlike the "being known for something" dimension of reputation, this 
dimension entails the aggregated judgement on multiple organizational attributes and not 
only one aspect (Fischer & Reuber, 2007). In this dimension of reputation therefore, 
audiences will shape a global impression of the social, financial, and environmental 
aspects of the organization and affectively evaluate its favorability as in comparison to 
other organizations (Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Rhee & Valdez, 2009).  
Besides the research that are focused on the definitions of reputation, there are two 
other major streams of research that are prominent in the corporate reputation literature, 
namely antecedents and outcomes of reputation. It is worth noting that the majority of the 
studies that have investigated either the antecedents or the outcomes of corporate 
reputation has treated it as a unidimensional construct with deep roots in the "being known 
for something" conceptualization (Lange at al., 2011).  
In terms of the antecedents of reputation, as reputation is shaped by the perceptions of 
stakeholders towards the organization and its attributes, various clues and signals have 
been identified as reputation's possible antecedents. Such clues include specific industry 
characteristics such as industry dominance (Shamsie, 2003), archival third-party ratings as 
determinants of status ordering (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), financial performance and 
firm size (Staw & Epstein, 2000), and resource signals such as the qualifications of an 
organization's members (Rindova et al., 2005). 
As in regard to the outcomes of reputation, the positive effect of reputation on the 
economic outcomes of the organization has been dominantly studied and evidenced in the 
literature (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Deephouse, 2000; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; 
Standifird, 2001). Despite the positive outcomes of reputation, there has been a growing 
sub-stream of research that has started to investigate the possible liabilities of having a 
good reputation. Rhee and Haunschild (2006) for instance have found supporting results 
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for their argument that reputable organization may suffer a more severe backlash from the 
market in the aftermath of a product recall.  
Status and status loss 
Status as an important social approval asset that gives the organization advantages 
over its competitors has attracted many scholars working in the social approval assets area 
of research. On the contrary to its simple appearance though, there has been no consensus 
on a definition of status among scholars (Piazza & Castellucci, 2014). Nevertheless, the 
concepts of order, rank, esteem, and prestige in a social system are recurring notions in the 
literature and hence, organizational status has been mostly described as “the prestige 
accorded to firms because of the hierarchical positions they occupy in a social 
structure” (Jensen & Roy, 2008). 
The role of status as an important signal of quality (Podolny, 1993, 1994) has been 
identified as a source of various benefits associated with occupying a higher status such as 
more social patronage and access to better opportunities (Marr & Thau, 2014). Besides the 
benefits of having a higher status (Podolny & Phillips, 1996) or the negative outcomes of 
not having a high status (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) though, our understanding of the 
dynamics of status and their consequences for the organization is rather limited (Piazza & 
Castellucci, 2014). Only recently, some scholarly work started to explored the possibility 
of individuals losing their status (Pettit, Yong, & Spataro, 2010). However, work on the 
consequences of status loss, specially on the organizational level, is still underdeveloped; 
and we don't know much about how organizations might behave in the aftermath of a 
status loss (Marr & Thau, 2014). 
Self-regulatory Focus Theory 
The main premise of self-regulatory focus theory is that gains and losses regulate 
behavior and decisions of social entities by promoting behavior and decisions that may 
yield likely gains and prevent likely losses (Galanter & Pliner, 1974). However, it has been 
argued that avoiding losses is a more powerful drive in decision making compared to 
achieving gains (Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1979). In that sense, achieving gains has been 
considered as an equal to achieving ideals and a compelling situation, whereas avoiding 
losses corresponds with fulfilling duties and obligations (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 
2000). Therefore, it is not surprising that social entities may prioritize loss aversion to gain 
achievement, although both yield two important end-states worthy of pursuing (Higgins 
1997). While achieving gains fulfills the need for nurturance, avoiding losses meets the 
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need for security (Idson et al., 2000). Although both needs are important to be fulfilled, the 
priority of security over nurturance has been emphasized in the literature (Higgins, 1998). 
The nurturance-seeking and security-seeking end-states shape two distinct points of 
focus in behavioral and decision making regulation (i.e., two regulatory foci): promotion 
focus and prevention focus that correspond to nurturance-seeking and security-seeking 
respectively (Higgins, 1998). While the former has a predilection for an approaching 
strategy toward ideals and new horizons related to aspirations, the latter has a tendency 
toward avoidance strategies to preserve security and status quo (Higgins, 1998; Idson et 
al., 2000).  
The distinct regulatory foci of promotion focus and prevention focus have contrasting 
implications for the decision making. Whereas the predominance of promotion focus 
intensifies the sensitivity toward the presence or absence of gains and positive outcomes, 
the prevalence of prevention focus amplifies the sensitivity to the absence and presence of 
losses and negative outcomes (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). Therefore, while promotion 
focus may encourage behaviors such as risk taking and exploration of new ideas that are 
aligned with its ideal attainment attribute, prevention focus may encourage stability and 
exploitation of status quo that are more in line with its safety seeking characteristic (Crowe 
& Higgins, 1997; Kark & Van Dijk, 2007). Therefore, it has been argued that those two 
discrete self-regulatory foci have two different underlying motivations: motivation for 
change in promotion focus and motivation for stability in prevention focus (Kluger, 
Stephan, Ganzach, & Hershkovitz, 2004; Van Dijk & Kluger, 2004).  
Self-affirmation and Self-enhancement Theories 
The theories of self-affirmation and self-enhancement are founded on the main 
assumption that under threatening events that jeopardize the self-integrity of a social entity 
and its positive view of self, it would undergo affirming processes that may protect its self-
integrity and self-worth (Jordan & Audia, 2012; Sherman & Cohen, 2002; Steele, 1988, 
1990). Such psychological protection self-system is activated after the occurrence of a 
threatening event, and takes effect until the former positive self-view is restored (Gilbert, 
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). The outcome of the activation of the self-
system will be a focus on the positive affirmation cues that may construe the threatening 
situation as less adverse (Heine & Lehman, 1997).  
Self-integrity refers to the appropriateness of a social entity and its adherence to the 
expected standards of its salient stakeholders (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Such standards 
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may refer to being distinct and superior in delivering value and important outcomes. A 
threat to self-integrity thus involves perception of failure in meeting socially salient 
standards (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Therefore, the threatened social entity will be 
susceptible to any events that may question its self-integrity, both regarding its own 
perceptions and others', and will attempt on restoring or reasserting their self-integrity 
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  
Nevertheless, self-affirmation and self-enhancement theories suggest that by seeking 
external affirmation cues that support the status quo , one may appease the threat and 
restore self-integrity and self-worth (Sherman & Cohen, 2002, 2006). In that sense, self-
affirmation and self-enhancement theories suggest a preserving and exploitative strategy 
that is distinct from explorative strategies that suggest accommodating the risk of change 
in the aftermath of the threatening event.  
Theory on Exploration and Exploitation 
Since the seminal work of March (1991), exploration and exploitation have been 
discussed and studies extensively in the literature and various debates have been evolved 
about different aspects of those constructs in organizations. Exploration, being associated 
with innovation and risk taking (March, 1991), and exploitation, being associated with 
efficiency and refinement (March, 1991), have been treated variously in the literature with 
some scholars having defined them as two extremes of a continuous spectrum (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006) and some others as orthogonal variables that could co-exist with various 
intensities (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  
With its focus on risk-taking and innovation, exploration's outcome for the 
organization has been defined as long-term oriented whereas with its variety-reducing and 
adaptability, exploitation's outcome for the organization has been characterized as short-
term oriented (Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). Nevertheless, it has been argued in the 
literature that organizations need a balanced mix of exploration and exploitation to be able 
to survive in the changing environments that necessitate both adaptability and change at 
the same time (Uotila et al., 2009).  
Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation is composed of one conceptual paper and two empirical studies, 
which altogether and using the aforementioned theoretical foundations attempt on 
rendering a better understanding of the overarching research question of "how do social 
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approval assets of the organization and their possible changes over time affect the 
organization's strategic decision making related to stability and change?".   
The first part that constitutes this dissertation is a conceptual piece that lays the 
underlying and overarching theoretical foundations of our argumentations. In this paper, I 
have theorized on the effect of corporate reputation on the stability-change interplay in 
organizations. On the contrary to the extensively-investigated positive short-term effects of 
having a good corporate reputation on the organization's outcomes, studies on the long-
term behavioral effects of reputation on organizations are in minority. To that purpose, this 
conceptual paper proposes that reputation acts as a behavioral compass that regulates the 
stability-change interplay, as the main dichotomous decision that could be affected by the 
path-dependent nature of reputation to a great extent. The paper further conceptualizes how 
reputation could play a crucial role in encouraging the stability-inducing initiatives of the 
organizations, while discouraging them from engaging in change initiatives. Further on, 
the paper investigates two sets of moderators in order to make the main argumentations 
more related to the possible contingencies that could affect the main relationship between 
reputation and the stability-change interplay. First, the paper investigates dynamism and 
organizational life-cycle as the general business environment factors that may foster a 
degree of uncertainty that could influence the impact of reputation on stability-change 
decisions. Second, the paper conceptualizes on how the social-embeddedness of reputable 
organizations may have a moderating effect on the main influence of reputation. To capture 
that influence, the paper investigates the moderating impacts of institutional ownership and 
the organization's network of relations. 
The second paper that constitutes this dissertation is an empirical piece investigating 
the impact of reputation on the investment decisions of the organization, both directly and 
in the presence of the moderating effect of securities analysts' recommendations. The 
premise of the paper is founded on the conceptual argumentations of the first paper, in 
Table 1.3 Underlying theories and methodologies of paper 1
Topic The effect of reputation on the stability-change interplay
Underlying theory Corporate reputation, stability-change
Method Conceptual paper
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which I move beyond the resource-based consequences of a firm’s reputation, and develop 
a behavioral perspective on the impact of corporate reputation on the organization. By 
applying the theory of self-regulatory focus, this paper suggests that highly reputable firms 
may tend to have a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus in their investment 
strategies. This tendency will lead the firm to opt for low-risk investments rather than high-
risk investments. Furthermore, by developing a contingency model, the paper further 
argues that the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions of the firm is 
strengthened by the negative recommendations of securities analysts. By finding 
supportive results for the hypotheses, this paper addresses emerging theories about the 
potential negative consequences of a firm's reputation and provide important insights for 
the theoretical understanding of the behavior of highly reputable firms. 
Finally, in the last paper of the dissertation, I expand the span of my research by 
looking into the behavioral effect of social approval assets other than reputation. To that 
purpose, in this paper I investigated how status loss could affect the explorative-
exploitative behavior of the organization. In this study I argue that a negative status shift is 
considered as a self-threat by the organization, which leads them to blame the current 
composition of their members for that. As a result, organizations facing a status loss would 
go through extreme makeovers in order to move away from what they were before. 
Furthermore, I developed theory on the moderating effects of celebrity and performance 
expectations. Celebrity via two mechanisms, namely the high level of public attention and 
the positive affections of stakeholders towards the organization, and performance 
expectations negatively moderate the main effect of status loss on the exploration-
exploitation. I also looked into the effect of historical status losses on the explorative-
exploitative behavior of the organization. The results showed that organizations are not 
Table 1.4 Underlying theories and methodologies of paper 2
Topic Firm reputation and investment decisions: The 
contingency role of securities analysts' recommendations
Underlying theory Corporate reputation, self regulatory focus theory
Method Panel analysis
Sample 128 firms with stocks being traded in the American 
securities market in the 2008-2011 period
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inclined to change their explorative-exploitative behavior as a result of a historical status 
loss. To test the hypotheses of this study, I used a sample of soccer clubs in the English 
premier league as a unique context in which all social approval assets and their 
corresponding dynamics and interactions are constantly in play. 
Table 1.6 shows the addressed gaps and the intended contributions of each study of 
my dissertation.  
Table 1.5 Underlying theories and methodologies of paper 3
Topic Status loss and organizational exploration/exploitation: 
The contingency role of celebrity and performance 
expectations
Underlying theory Status loss, behavioral theory of the firm, celebrity, self-
affirmation theory, self-enhancement theory, performance 
feedback, exploration/exploitation
Method FGLS regression analysis
Sample 400 data points regarding clubs competing in the English 
Premier Soccer League in ten consecutive seasons, from 
2005–2006 to 2014–2015
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Table 1.6 Addressed gaps and intended contributions
Study Research Gap Main Contributions
The effect of reputation on 
the stability-change 
interplay
our understanding of the 
behavioral role of 
reputation and its 
implications for the 
decision-making of a firm 
is rather limited.
providing a behavioral 
perspective on the 
consequences of being 
reputable. Extending the 
discussion on the possible 
burdens of reputation. 
Advancing research on the 
antecedents of stability and 
change.
Firm reputation and 
investment decisions: The 
contingency role of 
securities analysts' 
recommendations
Whilst most studies on firm 
reputation have focused on 
the benefits that reputation 
confers in terms of 
resources, its effects on 
behavioral outcomes have 
been overlooked.
I move beyond the resource-
based perspective on firm 
reputation by examining the 
behavioral consequences of 
firm reputation. I examine 
the contingency role of 
recommendations made by 
securities analysts – as an 
external source of 
performance feedback – in 
shaping the relationship 
between a firm’s reputation 
and its investment decisions. 
Status loss and 
organizational exploration/
exploitation: The 
contingency role of 
celebrity and performance 
expectations
Our understanding of the 
effect of status loss on 
organizations' decision 
making is limited.
I extend our current 
understanding of how status 
shifts, and not only status 
itself, may affect the 
strategic decision making 
process in organizations. I 
seek to advance research on 
the antecedents of 
exploration and exploitation. 
I seek to make an important 
contribution to the literature 
on social approval assets by 
showing that several of these 
assets are in play at any one 
time, and interact with one 
another to affect the 
behavior and decision-
making of organizations.
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CHAPTER 3. FIRM REPUTATION AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS: THE 
CONTINGENCY ROLE OF SECURITIES ANALYSTS' RECOMMENDATIONS  1
ABSTRACT 
Moving beyond resource-based consequences of a firm’s reputation, we develop a 
behavioral perspective on the impact of corporate reputation. Although there has been 
extensive discussion in previous studies of the benefits of reputation in terms of gaining 
resource advantages, we apply theory on self-regulatory focus to suggest that highly 
reputable firms may tend to have a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus in their 
investment strategies. This tendency will lead the firm to opt for low-risk investments 
rather than high-risk investments. Furthermore, we develop a contingency model and argue 
that the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions of the firm is further 
strengthened by the negative recommendations of securities analysts. We find support for 
our hypotheses. In doing so, we address emerging theories about the potential negative 
consequences of a firm's reputation and provide important insights for our theoretical 
understanding of the behavior of highly reputable firms.
KEYWORDS: Firm reputation, self-regulatory focus, expectancy violations theory, 
investment decisions, analysts' recommendations  
 This paper has been published in Long Range Planning:  1
Fasaei, H., Tempelaar, M.P. and Jansen, J.J., 2018. Firm reputation and investment decisions: The contingency 
role of securities analysts' recommendations. Long Range Planning, 51(5), pp.680-692.
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INRODUCTION 
The value of having a strong reputation has been well addressed and emphasized in 
the literature (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Schwaiger, 2004; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). Firm 
reputation has been argued to be an asset that is valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate, 
thereby giving those who possess it particular competitive advantages in the marketplace 
(Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Reputable firms achieve superior financial returns (Barney, 
1991; Grant, 1991b), have better access to capital markets (Beatty & Ritter, 1986), are able 
to attract higher-caliber employees (Fombrun, 1996), and can access potential investors 
more effectively (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). Nevertheless, whilst most studies on firm 
reputation have focused on the benefits that reputation confers in terms of resources, its 
effects on behavioral outcomes have been overlooked. In this study, we address this 
shortcoming and draw upon expectancy violations theory and regulatory focus theory to 
uncover the relationship between a firm’s reputation and its investment decisions. By doing 
so, our study provides important insights for research and practice by demonstrating that 
behavioral consequences may help in understanding the potential liabilities of a firm's 
reputation over time. In this way, we provide at least two important contributions to earlier 
research. 
First, we move beyond the resource-based perspective on firm reputation (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1986; Roberts & Dowling, 2002) by examining the behavioral consequences of 
firm reputation. Our behavioral perspective enriches emerging debates about the potential 
liabilities of having a high reputation (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010; Rhee & 
Haunschild, 2006) and challenges the notion that reputation may lead to a competitive 
advantage over time (Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015). We draw on research on expectancy 
violations theory and regulatory focus theory to explore how a firm’s reputation — as a 
risk-averting mechanism for the firm — may affect its strategic choices. It has been argued 
that reputation creates expectations among stakeholders that firms will continue to act in 
the same way and to the same standard as their reputation has been built upon (Pfarrer, 
Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Rhee and Haunschild, 2006). Firms that do not meet these 
expectations are punished more severely than their non-reputable competitors (Rhee and 
Haunschild, 2006). As such, reputable firms are expected to avoid violating expectations in 
this way. Informed by self-regulatory focus theory, we explain how and why a firm’s 
reputation affects the tendency of organizations to become risk-averse. Any social entity 
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regulates its behavior and strategic choices by opting either for a promotion-focus that is 
concerned with future-oriented growth and advancement or a prevention-focus that is more 
concentrated on safer choices which help maintain the status quo (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997). We argue that reputable firms are more likely to adopt a prevention focus when 
seeking to meet external expectations and to engage in low-risk investments rather than 
high-risk investments. 
 Second, we examine the contingency role of recommendations made by securities 
analysts – as an external source of performance feedback – in shaping the relationship 
between a firm’s reputation and its investment decisions. The reputation of a firm indicates 
how it is perceived by stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). With this comes a set of 
investment decisions that the reputable firm feels would prevent it from violating external 
expectations. However, while financial performance is a general indicator, it is hard for 
firms to get a sense of when they have either failed to fulfill external expectations or are at 
risk of doing so (Rhee & Valdez, 2009). One source of such information is securities 
analysts and their recommendations. A recurring theme in institutional theory is that 
pressures from external institutions such as securities analysts prompt firms to conform to 
the norms and expectations of those institutions (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988). Despite its 
relevance, the behavioral interplay between firms’ reputation and analysts’ 
recommendations has not yet been investigated. In this study, we argue that negative 
recommendations by analysts signal to reputable firms that stakeholder expectations are 
being violated. Because reputable firms are prone to prevention foci, these cues exacerbate 
their tendency to pursue low-risk investments.  
In this study, we test our hypotheses using a 128-firm sample over a period of four 
years, for a total of 512 firm-year observations. Our multi-source panel data set consists of 
both survey data on reputation and objective data on financial aspects. Consistent with our 
theoretical framework and argumentations, we find that a higher level of reputation 
encourages a firm to invest in low-risk initiatives, and discourages them from investing in 
high-risk strategic initiatives. Finally, when we investigate the moderating effect of 
securities analysts' recommendations, we find that receiving negative recommendations 
from securities analysts reinforces the main effect of firm reputation, namely that it makes 
firms more risk-averse in their investment decisions.  
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THEORY 
Firm Reputation as a Double-Edged Sword: Meeting and Violating Expectations 
A firm's reputation — perceived by the firm’s stakeholders — is a socially constructed 
organizational phenomenon that is rooted in its past performance and behavior (Lange, 
Lee, & Dai, 2011). The essence of the reputation construct is reflected in Fombrun's (1996) 
definition, where he defines firm reputation as the perceptual representation of the firm’s 
past actions and future prospects that determines the general appeal of the firm to all of its 
constituencies when compared to other similar firms. In most of the literature on firm 
reputation the focus has been on the fact that reputation is an invaluable and difficult to 
imitate asset that endows the firm with various benefits not enjoyed by its less reputable 
competitors (Boyd, Bergh, & Ketchen, 2010). Scholars have argued that firms with a 
strong reputation may enjoy a number of advantages, both financial and non-financial 
(Saxton & Dollinger, 2004; Turban & Cable, 2003). However, a careful review of the 
literature on firm reputation leads to the realization that an over-emphasis on the positive 
resource-based outcomes of reputation has somewhat diverted attention from its possible 
negative behavioral consequences for the organization over time (Highhouse, Brooks, & 
Gregarus, 2009).  
To that end, investigating the underlying psychological meaning of reputation should 
help to shed some light on the possible burdens of being reputable. As reputation is shaped 
in the minds of stakeholders, it involves the psychological processes of perception and 
interpretation (Love & Kraatz, 2009). Reputation contains a unique informational aspect 
that compensates for the informational asymmetry and uncertainty that stakeholders will 
naturally experience before initiating their dealings with a certain organization (Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990). In that sense, reputation acts as a type of promise to stakeholders, 
reassuring them that, based on past performance, the firm will be capable of delivering the 
quality and outcomes they expect in the future and that the firm’s future behavior will be 
predictable (Lange et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2000).  
At the same time, however, the reputable firm could lose all the benefits derived from 
its reputation if organizational errors are revealed or the firm fails to meet the expectations 
of its stakeholders (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). According to expectancy violations theory, 
when a violation of the expected behavior or outcome occurs, the violation will arouse and 
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distract the attention of the stakeholders (Burgoon, 1993). The violation will be arousing 
and distracting as it heightens and reallocates the attention of the stakeholders to the 
characteristics of the violator and the meaning of the violation act (Burgoon & Hubbard, 
2005). According to expectancy violations theory, when there is a violation of expected 
behavior or outcome, this will draw the attention of stakeholders to the violator, causing 
them to look more closely at the characteristics of the violator and the nature of the 
violation itself. However, instead of seeking to understand the reasons why the violation 
has occurred, stakeholders are more likely to react negatively, calling into question the 
character of the violator and imposing severe penalties. Furthermore, as stakeholders’ 
expectations of an organization mount, their backlash against any expectancy violations 
will become more severe (Burgoon & Poire, 1993). In line with this argument, Rhee and 
Haunschild (2006) argue that where firms have a very high reputation, this reputation 
enhances the expectations of stakeholders in such a way that they expect that the firm will 
consistently deliver the same high quality and value. Consequently, reputable firms will 
become more vigilant about maintaining their reputation over time and preventing 
themselves from making decisions that might endanger their capacity to meet stakeholder 
expectations. Over time, this will impose a certain self-regulation on the firm's decision-
making that encourages risk-aversion and maintenance of the status quo (Baron & Tang, 
2011; Hmieleski & Baron, 2008). Looking at the impact of firm reputation through the lens 
of self-regulation theory may help us to understand this effect better. 
Reputation as a Prevention-focused System of Self-regulation  
According to the theory of self-regulation, social entities are motivated to operate in a 
way that makes their actual self-state as close as possible to a desired end-state and as far 
as possible from an undesired one (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997, 1998). 
Therefore, social entities mostly operate under a discrepancy-reducing system, in which 
the goal is to overcome, over time, the discrepancy between social entity's actual self-state 
and the desired end-state (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1998; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, 
& Hymes, 1994). Higgins et al. (1994) propose there are two alternative strategies in any 
discrepancy-reducing system of self-regulation. In an ‘ideal’ self-regulatory system social 
entities aim to get closer to their ideal-selves by getting as close as possible to their 
maximal goals in terms of their wishes, hopes, and aspirations. In an ‘ought’ self-
regulatory system, their minimum goals are to avoid a mismatch between their actual self-
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state and ought-selves in terms of their obligations, duties, and responsibilities (Brendl & 
Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1989).  
The two alternative strategies in the self-regulatory system lead to two distinct 
psychological situations. While the psychological situation associated with an ‘ideal’ self-
regulation strategy involves the presence or absence of positive outcomes, in the ‘ought’ 
self-regulation strategy the psychological situation is defined by the presence or absence of 
negative outcomes (Higgins, 1989). Consequently, social entities that are run in accordance 
with an ‘ideal’ self-regulatory strategy will have a promotion focus and will be inclined to 
embark upon activities and decisions that help them to approach positive outcomes (i.e., 
meeting hopes and aspirations) (Higgins, 1996). Conversely, social entities that are 
concerned mostly with ‘ought’ self-regulatory strategies will have a prevention focus and 
will be inclined to embark upon activities and decisions that help them avoid negative 
outcomes (i.e., a failure to meet their duties and obligations) (Higgins et al., 1994).  
Based on studies that have elevated the initial individual-level theorization of 
regulatory focus to social systems (Florack & Hartmann, 2007; Levine, Higgins, & Choi, 
2000), we argue that firms may also differ in their collective regulatory focus. While firms 
with a promotion focus will be concerned with hopes, aspirations, and accomplishments, 
those with a prevention focus will be concentrated on duties, obligations, and safety. In 
promotion focus, hopes and aspirations serve as ‘ideals’ that function as maximal goals to 
achieve, and outcomes are reckoned in terms of gains/non-gains. In prevention focus, 
however, duties and obligations shape a series of ‘oughts’ that function as standards and 
minimal goals that need to be met, and outcomes will judged in terms of losses/non-losses 
(Brendl & Higgins, 1996; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000).  
In particular, we argue that firm reputation imposes a prevention-focused self-
regulation upon the firm. As reputation is shaped over time by the firm's consistent and 
predictable efforts to deliver a certain value to the stakeholders, that creates certain duties 
and obligations which the firm has to meet at any point in time (Mishina et al., 2010). 
Reputation helps stakeholders overcome any information asymmetries in their dealings 
with the organization and making their decisions (Stiglitz, 2000; Weigelt and Camerer, 
1988). Therefore, it is not surprising that any revelations or insinuations of possible 
organizational error in firms' performance or in the way they deliver value to their 
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stakeholders will incur more extreme negative reactions and penalties from stakeholders 
(Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). After all, reputation is a subtle, yet powerful, promise of value 
and quality, and the better the firm's reputation, the greater the extent to which any 
deviation from stakeholders' expectations will be perceived as an infringement of this 
implicit covenant (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  
Thus, reputation acts as a powerful internal prevention-focused regulator with certain 
risk-averting implications for the firm. Alongside the advantages that reputation confers on 
the firm, reputation itself acts as a powerful reference point and a psychological anchor 
that encourages the firm to perform and act in a rather predictable and consistent manner 
(Carter & Ruefli, 2006; Fombrun, 1996; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). In this way, a 
reputable firm will maintain its non-loss situation. Therefore, the need to maintain 
predictability in order to constantly benefit from the advantages of reputation is of primary 
concern when a reputable firm is devising strategies or making investment decisions 
(Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Therefore, we argue that, for a firm to sustain the 
financial and non-financial advantages it receives as a result of its reputation (Rindova & 
Fombrun, 1999), it needs to embark upon a continuous quest for non-loss strategies that 
will reinforce its prevention focus over time. As such, reputable firms whose investment 
choices are determined by a prevention focus should avoid errors of commission and steer 
clear of risky initiatives and actions (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Thus, reputable firms are 
encouraged to embark upon safe and low-risk investment patterns and do not tie the firm 
into irreversible or hard-to-reverse investments. 
At the same time, the loss-aversion and prevention focus in the highly reputable firm 
would steer it away from making investments that might have an adverse effect on its 
strategy of seeking certainty (Friedman & Förster, 2001). As the stakeholders of the 
reputable firm do not take either positive or negative surprises easily (Pfarrer et al., 2010), 
the firm has an incentive to avoid investments that are either irreversible or hard to reverse 
– specifically high-risk investments of long-term nature. For two reasons, this long-term 
orientation is the chief source of risk in this type of investment. First, it makes the 
investments, with their distant cash flows, hard to liquidate (Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). In 
that sense, the prevention focus that stems from protecting reputation stops the firm from 
investing in assets that are difficult to liquidate in times of need. Second, due to the long 
time horizon, there is a risk that an investment project will be mispriced. This higher risk 
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of mispricing will in turn be more harmful to the firm and the managers responsible, as the 
effects of mispricing of long-term investments will continue to be felt over a long period 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1990). This will make the prevention-focused reputable firm more 
hesitant about embarking upon high-risk investments. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 Hypothesis 1a: Firm reputation is positively related to low-risk investments by the 
firm. 
 Hypothesis 1b: Firm reputation is negatively related to high-risk investments by 
the firm.  
Firm Reputation and Investment Decisions of the Firm: The Moderating Role of 
Analysts' Recommendations  
Securities analysts have an important impact on firms' strategic decision-making by 
providing them with tangible cues about their past and prospective performance 
(Zuckerman, 2000). Securities analysts evaluate the past performance of firms and issue 
periodic reports that include recommendations about whether to buy, hold, or sell the stock 
of firms (Bradshaw, 2004; Westphal & Clement, 2008). Whereas "buy recommendations" 
are considered to be positive recommendations, "sell recommendations" are regarded as 
negative (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). Scholars have argued that recommendations may 
affect the processes of "resource allocation" and provide "definition of success" that are 
critical in shaping the strategic choices and investment patterns of the firm (Pollock & 
Gulati, 2007; Rao and Sivakumar, 1999). Financial markets, and securities analysts in 
particular, are typically a source of strong institutional pressure for firms, as they help 
firms to acquire the capital resources that are necessary for their continuing success over 
time (Benner, 2007; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Westphal & Clement, 2008). 
Receiving positive reactions from securities analysts has been viewed as being crucial for 
any firm's wellbeing (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), since they positively affect the firm's 
future stock value (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). 
When it comes to the reputable firm, the effect of analysts' recommendations in 
presenting the firm with tangible cues on how they have met the expectations of 
stakeholders becomes material. Recommendations from analysts provide firms with 
tangible external feedback on how well they have performed according to the performance 
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criteria of financial markets (Zuckerman, 2000). Whereas receiving positive 
recommendations provides tangible evidence that the expectations of stakeholders are 
being met, negative recommendations present the reputable firm with an explicit 
demonstration that the firm has deviated from stakeholder expectations. This is particularly 
important when we consider the fact that the prevention-focused self-regulatory effect of 
reputation makes the firm react in a certain way to such expectancy violations. While the 
absence of negative feedback implies a non-loss situation for the prevention-focused firm, 
the presence of negative feedback would suggest that a loss situation is imminent. 
Therefore, if it receives negative feedback from salient evaluators and critics (i.e., 
securities analysts), the prevention-focused firm is more likely to opt for strategic 
avoidance decisions, and steer clear of choices that threaten its status quo and could 
endanger its non-loss position (Higgins et al., 1994). 
For the reputable firm, as a prevention-focused organization, we argue that receiving 
negative feedback from securities analysts, as salient external evaluators of the firm 
performance and investment decisions, would indicate that performance of the reputable 
firm has not lived up to the expectations and is likely to experience a loss situation. As 
Idson et al. (2000) argue, negative feedback will make the firm more vigilant in the future 
and make it less eager to take risky decisions. By engaging in high-risk investments, the 
firm could be developing a misalignment with the demands in its environment and could 
be bringing more uncertainty, risk, and consequently a potential loss situation for the firm 
(Förster, Grant, Idson, & Higgins, 2001). As such, we argue that having received negative 
recommendations from securities analysts, the reputable firm will be more inclined to 
reduce its high-risk investments to avoid such risks and future loss situations.  
Conversely, we argue that receiving negative feedback and recommendations from 
analysts would strengthen the impact of reputation on low-risk investments. Upon 
receiving negative recommendations from securities analysts, a reputable firm’s main 
concern will be to move away from a potential loss situation, as represented by the 
perceived violation of expectations, and to re-establish a non-loss situation that will 
involve less risk and uncertainty and will once again meet the expectations of stakeholders 
(Van Dijk & Kluger, 2004). To that end, low-risk initiatives are easy-to-liquidate 
investments that enhance the reputable firm's ability to adjust its course in order to turn a 
loss situation into a non-loss situation. Therefore, we argue that when a reputable firm 
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receives negative recommendations, it will, because of its prevention focus, be more 
inclined to invest in low-risk initiatives. At the same time, receiving negative 
recommendations from securities analysts conveys a discouraging message about high-risk 
investments, which might bring a future loss situation for the firm. Therefore, we suggest 
that: 
 Hypothesis 2a: Securities analysts' recommendations moderate the relationship 
between firm reputation and low-risk investments in such a way that more negative 
recommendations strengthen the positive effect of firm reputation on low-risk 
investments. 
 Hypothesis 2b: Securities analysts' recommendations moderate the relationship 
between firm reputation and high-risk investments in such a way that more 
negative recommendations strengthen the negative effect of firm reputation on 
high-risk investments. 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
To test our hypotheses and build our statistical models, we used a mixture of survey 
and archival data. Our sample consists of all firms whose reputations have been rated by 
Reputation Institute, and are included in its Global RepTrak® Pulse under the United 
States listing. The United States listing consists of all the North American and international 
firms whose stocks are traded in the American securities market. This enabled us to have a 
sample with data available on all the independent, dependent, and control variables of our 
study.  
Taking into account the data that were available on all the independent, dependent, 
and control variables in our study, we used a panel consisting of a sample of 128 firms 
with their reputation scores being collected in the 2008–2011 period. We used the 
Compustat database as a source of financial data on the firms in our sample. Compustat 
collects financial information from firms' public filings. Following prior research (Benner 
& Ranganathan, 2012; Haunschild & Miner, 1997), we used I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System) to obtain data on securities analysts' recommendations.  
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Finally, because changes in strategic choices and investment decisions take some time 
to take effect, we followed existing studies and lagged all the data regarding our predictors 
and control variables for one year (e.g., Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). As a result, the data 
on reputation and our controls were gathered in the period of 2008–2011, while the data on 
our dependent variables are collected in the 2009–2012 period. 
Measures 
Low-risk investments as dependent variable. Looking at previous research (e.g., 
Bajtelsmit & VanDerhei, 1997; Vives, 1995), we can see that short-term investments have 
been used as the measure for low-risk investments. As short-term investments are those 
that can potentially be liquidated more easily, they are characterized as low-risk 
investments that pay off in the short run, and if they do not, they can be easily reversed in 
the short term to avoid detrimental and long-term losses. The measure of short-term 
investments is based on the items in the current asset section of the balance sheet that 
represent currently marketable investments, and are intended to be converted to cash 
within a relatively short period of time (Raddatz & Schmukler, 2014). The measure, 
namely Compustat's "Short-term Investments", includes all short-term investments 
maturing within one year and comprises the following items: accrued interest (included in 
short-term investments by the company), cash in escrow, cash segregated under federal and 
other regulations, certificates of deposit (included in short-term investments by the 
company), certificates of deposit reported as a separate item in the current assets section of 
the balance sheet, commercial paper, gas transmission companies’ special deposits, good-
faith and clearinghouse deposits for brokerage firms, government and other marketable 
securities (including stocks and bonds listed as short-term), margin deposits on commodity 
future contracts, marketable securities, money market fund, real estate investment trusts’ 
shares of beneficial interest, repurchase agreements (when shown as a current asset), 
restricted cash (when reported as a current asset), term deposits, time deposits and time 
certificates of deposit (savings accounts when shown as a current asset), and treasury bills 
(listed as short-term). We used short-term investment intensity by scaling total short-term 
investment by the firm's total assets. 
High-risk investments as dependent variable. Prior research has used long-term 
investments as the measure for high-risk investments (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1990), as 
they are hard to liquidate and bear a high risk of being mispriced over time. Following 
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earlier studies, we used capital expenditures as these are long-term and future-oriented 
investments that reflect a firm's decisions about its strategic direction (Benner & 
Ranganathan, 2012; Kotha & Nair, 1995; Maritan, 2001; Souder & Bromiley, 2012; 
Souder & Shaver, 2010). This item represents cash outflow or funds used to make 
additions to the company’s property, plant, and equipment, excluding amounts arising from 
acquisitions. We followed the approach used in prior research by using the variables' 
intensity by scaling each firm's yearly data by the firm's total assets (He & Wang, 2009; 
Ryan & Wiggins, 2001).  
Firm reputation as independent variable. For our independent variable, we used 
reputation scores reported by Reputation Institute's Global RepTrak® Pulse in the 2008–
2011 period. Global RepTrak® is a unique means of reputation measurement and the 
world's largest and highest quality normative reputation benchmark database. It is an 
annual ranking and individual rating for more than 2000 companies operating in 20 
industries, across 40 countries, using responses from all the different stakeholder groups, 
including the general public.  
The Global RepTrak® Pulse is "an emotion-based measure of the firm reputation 
construct that untangles the drivers of firm reputation from measurement of the construct 
itself" (Ponzi, Fombrun, & Gardberg, 2011). In that capacity, its comprehensiveness, as a 
global measure of reputation that reflects the opinions of a wide variety of stakeholders, is 
unrivaled, and gives it the potential for generalizability and makes it an accurate reflection 
of reputation (Fombrun, Ponzi, & Newburry, 2015). Global RepTrak® captures the 
emotional bond, in terms of the degree of admiration, trust, good feeling, and overall 
esteem, that stakeholders and the general public hold towards a certain firm across 23 
attributes within seven major dimensions of reputation (Ponzi et al., 2011). The Global 
RepTrak®'s attributes and their corresponding dimensions of reputation are profitability, 
high-performance, and strong growth prospects under the performance dimension; high 
quality, value for money, standing behind, and meeting customer needs under the products 
& services dimension; innovativeness, being first to market, and adapting quickly to 
change under the innovation dimension; rewarding employees fairly, caring for employee 
well-being, and offering equal opportunities under the workplace dimension; openness and 
transparency, behaving ethically, and fairness in the way it does business under the 
governance dimension; being environmentally responsible, supporting good causes, and 
having positive influence on society under the citizenship dimension; and being well 
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organized, having an appealing leader, having an excellent management, and having a clear 
vision for its future under the leadership dimension (Fombrun et al., 2015).  
As such, there are two unique points that distinguish Global RepTrak® from similar 
measures, and that make it particularly good for reputation measurement. First, Global 
RepTrak® is very much aligned with the inherent meaning of reputation because it tracks 
the perceptions and feelings of stakeholders regarding a firm's capacity to deliver what is 
expected of it across a wide range of factors that shape the reputation of the firm. In that 
sense, it differs from other measures, such as the well-known Fortune's most admired 
companies, which address predominantly the financial aspects of a firm's past performance 
(Brown & Perry, 1994; Fryxell & Wang, 1994). Second, Global RepTrak® aggregates the 
perceptions and views of a wide variety of stakeholder groups including the general public, 
and by doing so it sets itself apart from Fortune's most admired companies measure that 
relies solely on the views of certain stakeholder groups (i.e., taking only the views of 
executives, directors, and securities analysts into account). It has been also empirically 
proven that the Global RepTrak® framework and its underlying seven dimensions and 23 
attributes have high reliability, and high internal and external validity in capturing 
reputation, and are applicable across different stakeholder groups, industries, and countries 
(Fombrun et al., 2015). 
Securities analysts' recommendations. As our moderating variable we used analysts' 
mean recommendations in order to capture the degree of consensus among securities 
analysts regarding their evaluation of particular firms. We calculated a measure of the 
mean analysts' recommendations for each of the firms in our sample in any given year 
during the period for which we were collecting data (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). We 
obtained our data on recommendations from the consensus recommendations in the I/B/E/
S dataset, and its respective coding schema. The I/B/E/S database records the mean 
analysts' recommendations on a five-point scale where 1 = "strong buy", 2 = "buy', 3 = 
"hold", 4 = "underperform", and 5 = "sell" (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012; Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2015). 
Control variables. As we use the fixed effect model in our panel data models, we 
control for the "differences among firms" that are invariant over time. Fixed effect models 
only exploit within-firm variation. We also control for year so that we control for the 
conditions that would affect all firms in our panel sample in a particular year. By doing so, 
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we control for time-invariant and unobservable firm attributes (Benner & Ranganathan, 
2012; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015).  
Furthermore, we follow existing literature and control for other variables that could 
affect the investment decisions of the firm. We control for the firm size, measured by the 
natural logarithm of the firm's revenue, for two reasons. First, larger firms could have a 
natural tendency to favor more short-term investments and less long-term investments. 
Second, analysts might favor larger firms by issuing more positive recommendations, since 
trading in larger firms would bring in more commission for them (Ioannou & Serafeim, 
2015), and also the better revenues (i.e., the larger the firm is) will indicate that the firm is 
in better financial health (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). In that regard we also control for 
market value of the firm (the natural logarithm), since this is also a signal of the financial 
health of the firm and of its financial performance; we also control for return on assets 
(ROA) as this is an important profitability measure for firms (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015). 
We control for industry revenue (the sum of revenue for all firms falling within a particular 
SIC code) to capture changes in firms’ overall competitive environment (Benner & 
Ranganathan, 2012). Although only a few firms in our sample reported their research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, which can provide another possible demonstration of 
future-oriented investment by a firm (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003), we control for it. We 
also control for retained earnings and intangible assets as two other variables that could 
affect our dependent variables. We obtained the financial data relating to all of our control 
variables using the Compustat data-base. 
Statistical Procedure 
To test our hypotheses, we use panel data and panel analysis techniques. The 
longitudinal nature of the data ensures information-rich analyses and precise estimations as 
there is a considerable degree of variability between the different entities and also a low 
degree of variability for any single entity over time (Hausman, 1978; Hoechle, 2007). As 
we aim to trace the effect of reputation and the moderating effect of securities analysts' 
recommendations on the firm’s subsequent investment choices over time, using panel data 
and panel analysis seemed to be the best approach. Our models incorporate firm and year 
fixed effects. Our lagged predictors and control variables allow us to capture the possible 
causal relationships between independent and dependent variables. To build our models we 
use xtscc command in Stata, which estimates fixed-effects (within) regression models with 
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Driscoll and Kraay standard errors. Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are robust to 
general forms of spatial (i.e., cross-sectional) and temporal dependence (Hoechle, 2007).  
Our research design with firm fixed effects allows us to control for differences 
between firms that might drive variation in short-term and long-term investments (i.e., our 
dependent variables). Nevertheless, as in most firm-level strategy research, it is very 
important in our study that we should guard against possible endogeneity (i.e., error terms 
must not be correlated with independent and control variables) in order to ensure a high 
validity for our results. Similarly, we also need to avoid unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., 
statistical inferences may be erroneous if, in addition to the observed variables within the 
study, other relevant but unobserved variables exist that correlate with the observed 
variables). For instance, the same unmeasured factors that lead firms to invest in short-term 
initiatives may also lead to a higher reputations for firms. Thus, there is a risk that a third, 
unobserved factor is driving both the dependent and independent variables. Nonetheless, 
our study addresses this issue in several ways. To control for possible endogeneity, we lag 
our independent and control variables by one year. This should give us increased 
confidence in our findings, and mitigate the risk of reverse causality. For instance, we can 
at least be confident that changes in our dependent variables are to a large extent due to 
changes in the firm reputation. Furthermore, our models employ a robust panel design with 
firm fixed effects and year controls. Such panel data models provide a particularly 
effective way of mitigating against the possible risks of unobserved heterogeneity; that is, 
they offer us the “ability to control for all stable covariates, without actually including 
them in a regression equation” (Allison & Waterman, 2002). These models hence 
“condition on” the changes in independent and dependent variables year-to-year within 
firms (rather than differences in the levels of both types of variables across firms), making 
it more likely that a change in firm reputation is causing a subsequent change in a firm’s 
investment. 
Finally, we have ensured that our models are controlled for possible heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation (also known as autocorrelation) and for cross-sectional and temporal 
correlation by running a fixed-effects panel regression using Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007). It is common for panel data sets to exhibit 
all sorts of cross-sectional and temporal dependencies, which could result in 
overestimations in consequent analyses (Hoechle, 2007). Hence, overlooking possible 
correlation of regression disturbances over time and between subjects can lead to biased 
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statistical inferences. To ensure the validity of the statistical results, we include a 
regression on our panel data in order to adjust the standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates for possible dependence in residuals. By doing so, we control for the possible 
cross-sectional or spatial and temporal dependence, as well as for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistency issues. Heteroskedasticity of standard errors – or, in other 
words, a non-constant variance of errors, given the independent variables – would lead to 
biased estimations and an overestimation of the model. Subsequently, the presence of 
heteroskedasticity could invalidate statistical tests of significance that assume that the 
modeling errors are uncorrelated and normally distributed and that their variances do not 
vary with the effects being modeled. An equally severe issue, especially in longitudinal 
data sets, is autocorrelation or serial correlation of residuals across entities. As a 
consequence, the standard errors would be under and the t-scores overestimated and the 
results would be biased and invalid. However, using the Driscoll and Kraay robust 
standard errors that are autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-consistent ensures the best 
linear unbiased estimators (Wooldridge, 2010) testing this study’s hypotheses. 
RESULTS 
Our study suggests that one of the main possible findings arising from our theory 
development would be that a high reputation can lead firms to reduce their engagement in 
high-risk investments and to become more focused on low-risk investments . Furthermore 2
our moderating hypotheses suggest that negative recommendations from securities analysts 
strengthen the main prevention-focus effect of reputation on investment decisions of the 
firm.  
 Although our dependent variables could have been treated as a ratio (i.e., the ratio of 2
low-to-high risk investments), we treated them as two separate dependent variables for one 
main reason. Firms can embark upon high-risk investments using long-term retained 
earnings or debt. In that sense, in their source of financing, high-risk investments are 
distinguished from low-risk investments that are mainly funded by cash in hand (e.g., cash 
in escrow) or short-term marketable securities. Our statistical findings also support such a 
separation. Looking at the correlations in Table 1 (i.e., summary statistics), we realize that 
the two types of investments are not highly correlated. Furthermore, the coefficients in 
Tables 2 and 3 clearly show that there is a meaningful distinction between the absolute 
sizes of the main effect of reputation on low-risk and high-risk investments, supporting our 
argumentation that low-risk and high-risk investments should be indeed treated as two 
separate variables. Therefore, we can conclude that the two investment types are not 
exactly two ends of a spectrum and firms could embark upon both simultaneously and with 
various degrees.
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Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics and within-panel correlation coefficients 
for the variables used in our study. Looking at the distribution pattern of our variables' 
values, we can see there is considerable variation. Table 3.1 also provides within pairwise 
correlations between our variables.            
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                  Table 3.1 
         Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Low-risk investment 0.12 0.1 1.000
2. High-risk investment 0.04 0.035 -0.2 1.000
3. Reputation 66.12 9.34 0.05 -0.02 1.000
4. Analysts' 
recommendations
2.32 0.38 -0.18 0.03 0.01 1.000
5. R&D expenditure 0.02 0.039 0.43 -0.02 0.2 0.06 1.000
6. Retained earnings 9.35 1.4 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.25 0.1 1.000
7. Intangible assets 0.19 0.19 -0.15 -0.15 0.14 -0.12 0.1 0.02 1.000
8. Size 10.37 1.01 -0.16 0.15 -0.18 -0.14 -0.08 0.63 -0.08 1.000
9. ROA 0.05 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.18 -0.27 0.2 0.18 0.12 0.05 1.000
10. Market value 10.16 1.35 0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.38 0.13 0.78 0.17 0.6 0.38 1.000
11. Industry revenue 12.1 1.55 -0.12 -0.01 -0.35 0.03 -0.03 0.35 -0.36 0.43 -0.18 0.26 1.000
Note: Correlations with absolute 
value equal to or greater than 0.13 are 
significant at p < 0.05
Table 3.2 depicts the results to test our hypotheses 1a and 2a. Hypothesis 1a predicts 
that reputable firms are more likely to engage in low-risk investments. Model 1 shows the 
effect of control variables on the dependent variable. The negative effect of size and 
intangible assets, and the positive effect of retained earnings (all highly significant at 
p<0.01) are the notable elements here. When we add the independent variable of firm 
reputation, as we can see in Model 2, the coefficient is positive and highly significant (at 
p<0.01), suggesting that, on average, the more reputable firms tend to engage in low-risk 
investments, supporting our hypothesis 1a. Model 3 replaces the independent variable with 
analysts' recommendation to see its particular direct effect on low-risk investments. The 
resultant effect is negative and highly significant (at p<0.01), suggesting that receiving 
more negative analysts' recommendations has a negative effect on low-risk investments of 
the firm. In Model 4 we use both reputation and analysts' recommendations as independent 
variables to investigate their concurrent effects on low-risk investments. The result is in 
line with the findings of Model 2 and Model 3, in which we found significant results (at 
p<0.01) for the separate independent variables' effects on low-risk investments. Model 5 
adds the moderating effect of analysts' recommendations. The significant positive 
coefficient (at p<0.05) suggests that negative recommendations from securities analysts 
will strengthen the positive main effect of reputation on a firm's low-risk investments, 
supporting our hypothesis 2a. 
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Table 3.2 
 Effect of Firm Reputation on Low-Risk Investment
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Reputation (t – 1) a 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Analysts' recommendations (t – 
1) a
-0.01*** -0.02*** -0.07***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.02)
Interaction (analysts' 
recommendations × reputation)
0.08**
(0.03)
R&D expenditure (t – 1) -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Retained earnings (t – 1) 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Intangible assets (t – 1) -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.34***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Size (t – 1) b -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ROA (t – 1) -0.05 -0.08** -0.06* -0.08** -0.09**
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Market value (t – 1) b 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry revenue (t – 1) b 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.25*** 0.24***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22
     Standard errors in parentheses 
      a  Centered
          b  Logarithm      
           *  p<0.1 
         **  p<0.05 
       ***  p<0.01
Table 3.3 depicts the results of testing our hypotheses 1b and 2b. Model 1 once again 
shows the effect of control variables on the dependent variable. The negative and highly 
significant effect of retained earnings (p<0.01), and the highly significant positive effect of 
size (at p<0.01) and ROA (p<0.05), on high-risk investments are noteworthy here. Model 2 
introduces the independent variable of firm reputation to the analysis. The coefficient is 
negative and highly significant (at the p<0.01 level), suggesting that, on average, firms 
with higher reputations are less inclined to embark on high-risk investments, supporting 
our hypothesis 1b. Model 3 replaces reputation with analysts' recommendations as the 
independent variable. The effect is positive and highly significant (at p<0.01), suggesting 
that receiving more negative analysts recommendations will increase a firm's high-risk 
investments. Model 4 once again uses both reputation and analysts' recommendations as 
independent variables and investigates their simultaneous effects on high-risk investments 
of the firm. The result confirms our previous findings in Model 2 and Model 3 of Table 
3.3. Model 5 adds the moderating effect of analysts' recommendations. The significant 
(p<0.05) negative coefficient supports our hypothesis 2b, suggesting that negative 
recommendations from securities analysts will intensify the initial negative effect of 
reputation on the high-risk investments of the firm. 
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Table 3.3 
Effect of Firm Reputation on High-risk Investment
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Reputation (t – 1) a -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Analysts' recommendations (t – 1) a 0.004*** 0.01*** 0.04**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.02)
Interaction (analysts' 
recommendations × reputation)
-0.05**
(0.02)
R&D expenditure (t – 1) 0.14* 0.15** 0.14* 0.14** 0.14**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Retained earnings (t – 1) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Intangible assets (t – 1) -0.01* -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.004**
(0.01) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Size (t – 1) b 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.005)
ROA (t – 1) 0.05** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.06*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Market value (t – 1) b -0.002 -0.001 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry revenue (t – 1) b 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.05** -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R-squared 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.21
     Standard errors in parentheses 
      a  Centered
          b  Logarithm      
           *  p<0.1 
         **  p<0.05 
       ***  p<0.01
The graphs of interactions in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that negative analyst 
recommendations lead to an increase in low-risk and a decrease in high-risk investments. 
Therefore, as reflected in our results, negative recommendations reinforce the prevention-
focus effect of reputation on a firm's investment decisions. 
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Figure 3.1 
Moderation Effect of Analysts’ Recommendations on Reputation-Low Risk 
Investment Relationship 
Figure 3.2 
 Moderation Effect of Analysts’ Recommendations on Reputation-High Risk
Investment Relationship
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DISCUSSION 
Although significant efforts have been made in earlier research, using the resource-
based view as the analytical lens, to identify the immediate positive outcomes for firms of 
having a good reputation, the main goal of our study was to investigate what effects 
reputation had on firms’ behavior over time, specifically with regard to their investment 
decisions. Our study therefore has a number of important implications for theory and 
practice.  
First, in this study we consider the hitherto somewhat neglected behavioral effects that 
a high reputation can have on a firm, and how it can affect the firm's strategic choices and 
investment decisions over time. Our approach to the construct and measurement of 
reputation is a generalizable one, ensuring that our theorizing is not context-specific, and 
our findings and conclusions could therefore be applicable to any firm in any context. In 
that sense, we add to the relatively small number of recent context-specific attempts to 
address the behavioral consequences of possessing specific types of reputation (e.g., 
Petkova, Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2014). Having a good reputation has largely been 
considered to be a source of competitive advantage for a firm (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; 
Walker, 2010). The dominant perspective in the existing literature is deeply rooted in the 
resource-based view of the organizational construct. In that sense, current studies on firm 
reputation merely see reputation as a valuable resource which brings a firm a sustainable 
competitive advantage and better financial performance (Galbreath, 2005; Rindova et al., 
2005). It is therefore very valuable to explore what behavioral effects a good reputation has 
on the firms concerned and on the decisions they make. By positing that firm reputation 
can also be viewed as a source of performance feedback and as an organizational behavior 
gauge which could then affect the firm’s subsequent behavior and choices over time, we 
advance reputation research by providing a more detailed behavioral perspective on 
reputation. The low-risk investment focus that stems from reputation may prove 
detrimental for the sustainability of a firm's competitive advantage. 
Second, our findings have important implications for the strategy and firm reputation 
literature in that they show the potential danger of short-sightedness that possessing a high 
reputation could create within the firm. Confirming our hypotheses, our study suggests that 
a certain type of prevention-focused self-regulatory mechanism may exist in highly 
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reputable firms, and our findings provide evidence that the positive effect of reputation can 
lead them to pursue less risky short-term investments, while its negative effect can 
dissuade them from pursuing riskier long-term investments. It may be that as stakeholders 
of highly reputable firms make decisions based on their inferences drawn from the firm’s 
past performance (Mishina et al., 2012), they put pressure on the firm to continue with safe 
and tested behaviors and avoid acting in ways that are risky or unexpected. The fact that 
stakeholders have certain expectations instills a prevention focus in the highly reputable 
firm that regulates its strategic behavior and investment decisions in a certain way. This 
will encourage it to invest in safe, low-risk initiatives that have immediate positive results 
for the firm and are constantly informative about the firm's quality. At the same time, our 
findings regarding the negative effect of reputation on the high-risk investments of the firm 
provide some novel insights for research on reputation and strategy. In keeping with earlier 
arguments, the prevention focus that a firm acquires as a result of its good reputation 
suggests that reputation discourages the firm from investing in long-term initiatives that 
are typically interwoven with high risks that could eventually prevent the firm from 
achieving the goals expected of it.  
Third, we advance research on firm reputation at the intersection of strategy and 
organizational behavior by developing a novel theory regarding the prevention-focused 
self-regulatory effect of firm reputation. This prevention focus means that those within the 
firm will feel under pressure to invest mainly in safe initiatives and overlook riskier long-
term investments. The implication of this is particularly crucial, since, as previous studies 
have shown, some highly reputable firms have failed as a result of placing too much 
emphasis on less risky but short-term investments in their current strategies, and have at 
the same time fallen short in taking on risky long-term investments that would have 
enabled them to develop new capabilities (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). While we do not 
claim that possessing a high reputation played a definite role in the downfall of such firms, 
our study provides deeper insights into how the desire to maintain reputation and to 
continue meeting the expectations of stakeholders effectively narrows the range of choices 
that firms see as being open to them. Therefore, we argued that reputable firms become 
somewhat myopic, opting for the less risky short-term and dismissing more adventurous 
but riskier long-term investment options. 
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Our study also advances current understanding of the relationship between 
organizational reputation and external performance feedback in terms of the behavioral 
outcomes that stem from the interaction between the two. The importance of investigating 
this relationship stems from the fact that, even though firm reputation is an indication of 
how the firm is performing in relation to its stakeholders’ expectations, the effect of 
reputation on the decision-making of the firm will be further strengthened when there is 
tangible and explicit negative feedback on performance from external experts. In that 
sense, although both firm reputation and analysts' recommendations can be seen as 
evaluations of an organization's actions and decisions by a social system, they seem to be 
the products of rather fundamentally different forms of assessment (Deephouse, 1999; 
Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Whereas analysts' recommendations are concerned with the 
need for inclusion and compliance to taken-for-granted standards, firm reputation is built 
on the need for distinction (King & Whetten, 2008). In order to examine how the 
interaction between reputation and analysts' recommendations may affect strategic and 
investment decisions of firms over time, we develop a theory on the moderating effect of 
securities analysts' recommendations, as an important source of institutional performance 
feedback (Westphal & Graebner, 2010), on the internal self-regulatory mechanism of firm 
reputation. We subsequently contribute to the literature that lies at the intersection of 
institutional performance feedback and firm reputation by investigating how external 
institutions, and securities analysts in particular, provide firms with tangible fact-based 
cues that moderate the influence of their reputation on the investment decisions they make. 
Our theory and supporting evidence suggest that reputable firms use securities analysts' 
negative recommendations as an important source of performance feedback that affects 
their investment decisions. In line with the logic of expectancy violation theory, negative 
recommendations from analysts accentuate the tendency towards prevention focus in 
reputable firms, making firms switch their investment decisions away from riskier and 
potentially loss-making investments towards safer, non-loss investments. 
Fourth, this study also makes a substantial empirical contribution by providing 
evidence from a panel dataset and longitudinal statistical methods. The panel data models 
used in this study allow us to show that it is the changes in the level of reputation within-
firm over time that drive the changes in the investment decisions of firms. This 
characteristic is crucial in enabling us to identify the causal relationships between our 
variables over a certain period, and it makes this approach very different from simple 
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cross-sectional regressions that try only to suggest certain associations between variables at 
a certain point in time. 
Fifth, our study contributes to management practice by providing rather counter-
intuitive results and conclusions. As firm reputation has almost always been regarded as a 
valuable organizational asset that provides numerous advantages in the marketplace, 
nurturing capabilities and embarking upon actions that will enhance reputation has been 
always considered as a necessity (Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015). Nonetheless, by revealing 
the longer-term behavioral consequences of having a higher reputation, our study pinpoints 
the fact that being reputable is not without its burdens. The consequent short-sightedness 
with regard to investment decisions that the prevention focus associated with higher levels 
of reputation may bring is something that managers should bear in mind. As reputation 
encourages tactical short-term investments at the expense of more strategic long-term 
investments, managers of highly reputable organizations must be aware of the possible 
dangers of their firm's reputation. The short-term orientation effect of reputation on the 
investment decisions of the firm could result in the firm becoming less agile as it may fail 
to develop or invest in the types of initiatives and capabilities needed to help it cope with 
change and respond to emerging opportunities in the future. This is a particularly crucial 
finding for managers interested in the adaptation and survival of their organization, since 
they must constantly take steps to strike a balance between continuous short-term 
investments on the one hand, and exploration of future competencies through long-term 
investments on the other (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2006; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). Managers therefore need to be aware that the 
resource-related benefits that can accrue from their firm’s reputation may be countered by 
the myopic effect that reputation can have on the strategic choices made by the firm over 
time. 
Finally, our study also has another important implication for practice as it looks into 
the moderating effect of negative analysts' recommendations on the main effect that 
reputation has on the investment decisions of firms. Looking into our findings, we realize 
that negative analysts' recommendations strengthen the positive and negative effect of 
reputation on low-risk and high-risk investments respectively. On the contrary, the direct 
effect of negative analysts' recommendations on the investment decisions of the firm is 
otherwise, in which they have a negative effect on low-risk investments and a positive 
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effect on high-risk investments. Therefore, we could conclude that the natural effect of 
receiving negative recommendations from securities analysts on the decision making of 
firms will be the opposite of its effect when it is combined with the main, and probably the 
dominant, effect of reputation. That being said, managers of reputable firms should 
consider those countervailing effects in making their investment decisions to make 
conscious and deliberate decisions that would benefit their organizations. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Some of the limitations of our study also provide opportunities for future research. 
Our focus on investigating the effect of reputation on the investment decisions of firms 
regarding low-risk or high-risk investments could provide opportunities for future research 
in two ways. First, future studies could explore other behavioral consequences of having a 
high firm reputation by investigating other types of strategic choices made by firms. For 
instance, the effect of reputation on a firm’s ability to develop capabilities regarding the 
strategic dichotomies such as exploitation/exploration could be an valuable avenue to 
explore. Second, as we found evidence of there being a prevention-focus mechanism 
behind the reputation construct, this suggests that in firms with a high reputation there may 
be a focus on stability and on maintaining the status quo. Future studies could explore this 
notion further, and examine other short-term/long-term effects of reputation with regard to 
its distinctive self-regulatory focus. In that sense, they could go beyond our sole focus on 
the investment decisions of firms, and investigate other behavioral outcomes of reputation 
regarding its prevention-focus. 
The method we used to measure our independent variable also had its limitations, 
since we opted for a unidimensional interpretation of reputation and its associated measure. 
In that sense, we measured reputation as a reflection of the perceptions of the firm held by 
all the firm's stakeholders. Nonetheless, there has been a strong and emerging trend in the 
management literature on firm reputation that promotes the notion that reputation is 
multidimensional (Lange et al., 2011). In a multidimensional perspective, "...a firm's 
reputation rests on individuals’ categorizations and evaluations of the 
organization” (Fischer & Reuber, 2007). These categorizations and evaluations could in 
turn be investigated by looking at the possible mechanisms that underlie reputational 
change processes, such as being known, being known for something, and generalized 
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favorability, or by approaching reputation as a singular construct but measuring it from the 
perspective of various stakeholders (Lange et al., 2011). Either way, this would provide a 
multidimensional measurement of reputation, and would differ from the measurement path 
that we took in this study, and this could provide new insights for management research. 
Finally, for the purpose of our analysis, and since industries differ significantly on 
measures such as free cash flow and cost of capital, we controlled for differences across 
industries using a series of dummy variables. Nevertheless, it could be an insightful 
direction for future research to investigate the behavioral effects of reputation within 
different industries. This could give us new insights into industry-specific factors that 
might facilitate or hinder certain effects that reputation has on the strategic choices of 
firms. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation, I intend to make crucial implications to both theory and practice 
by extending and combining theories from literature on corporate reputation, status shifts, 
celebrity, performance feedback and expectations of market analysts, and exploration/
exploitation. I firstly elaborate and theorize on how corporate reputation, although being a 
valuable organizational resource that gives the organization competitive advantage over its 
competitors, could navigate the behavior and decision making of the organization in such a 
way that higher levels of reputation may lead the organization to pursue more exploitation 
and less exploration. Only then I put the developed theory into empirical examination and 
look into the effect of reputation on the exploration/exploitation manifestation in 
investment decisions of the organization. By doing so I draw the attention of scholars and 
practitioners alike to the effect that reputation may have on the behavior and decision 
making of organizations. In that sense, I go beyond the general attribution of a mere 
valuable resource to corporate reputation and look at it as a construct that also has 
behavioral repercussions for the organization, specifically in terms of short-term 
orientation that it brings upon the organization. 
Secondly, I draw attention to the fact that social approval assets such as status should 
be seen as dynamic constructs that could experience negative shifts over time. 
Furthermore, I discuss and empirically test how such negative shifts may affect the 
decision making of organization, specifically in regard to its exploration/exploitation 
decision making. Thirdly, I examine how the main effects of reputation and status loss 
could be further affected by important moderators of celebrity and performance 
expectations of market analysts.  
In this final chapter of my dissertation I firstly provide an overview of my main 
propositions, hypotheses and findings. Afterwards I will discuss the theoretical and 
practical implications of my findings in detail. 
Summary of Main Propositions, Hypotheses and Findings 
Study 1 is a conceptual work that lays the foundation for the second study of my 
dissertation. The main premise of this study is that due to its path-dependent nature, 
corporate reputation may be a promoter of stability initiatives and at the same time a 
demoter of change initiatives. Building upon previous literature (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 
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2013; Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012), I propose that reputable firms are expected to 
stick to more familiar initiates over time in order to maintain stability and the trust of their 
stakeholders. I then look into the contingencies that may affect this main relationship. 
Table 5.1 summarizes those propositions. 
Table 5.1  Propositions of Study 1
Propositions Nature of Effect
Proposition 1a: Firms with higher levels of reputation are 
more inclined to engage in stability initiatives over time.
main effect
Proposition 1b: Firms with higher levels of reputation are less 
inclined to engage in change initiatives over time.
main effect
Proposition 2a. The positive effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in stability initiatives is stronger under higher 
levels of environmental uncertainty.
moderation
Proposition 2b. The negative effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in change initiatives is stronger under higher 
levels of environmental uncertainty.
moderation
Proposition 3a. The positive effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in stability initiatives is weaker in the initial 
development stage of the firm's life cycle.
moderation
Proposition 3b. The negative effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in change initiatives is weaker in the initial 
development stage of the firm's life cycle.
moderation
Proposition 4a. The positive effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in stability initiatives is stronger in the later 
development stage of the firm's life cycle.
moderation
Proposition 4b. The negative effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in change initiatives is stronger in the later 
development stage of the firm's life cycle.
moderation
Proposition 5a. The positive effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in stability initiatives is weaker under higher 
levels of institutional ownership structure within the firm.
moderation
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In study 2, I investigated how corporate reputation may have a significant effect on the 
investment decisions of the firm. Using a panel dataset of 128 firms from various 
industries, our longitudinal study and its results show that higher levels of reputation 
encourage the firm to embark upon more low-risk investments and less high-risk 
investments. Furthermore, I looked into the contingency role of securities analysts' 
recommendations in moderating the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions 
of the firm. In that regard, I found evidence on the strengthening effect of negative 
recommendations on the main relationship between reputation and investment decisions. 
Table 5.2 depicts the hypotheses of study 2 and the main results in a nutshell. 
Proposition 5b. The negative effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in change initiatives is weaker under higher 
levels of institutional ownership structure within the firm.
moderation
Proposition 6a. The positive effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in stability initiatives is stronger in firms 
embedded in sparse networks.
moderation
Proposition 6b. The negative effect of reputation on the firm's 
engagement in change initiatives is stronger in firms 
embedded in sparse networks.
moderation
Table 5.1  Propositions of Study 1
Nature of EffectPropositions
Table 5.2 Hypotheses and Results of Study 2
Hypotheses Result
Hypothesis 1a: Firm reputation is positively related to low-
risk investments by the firm.
Supported
Hypothesis 1b: Firm reputation is negatively related to high-
risk investments by the firm.
Supported
Hypothesis 2a: Securities analysts' recommendations 
moderate the relationship between firm reputation and low-
risk investments in such a way that more negative 
recommendations strengthen the positive effect of firm 
reputation on low-risk investments.
Supported
53
Finally, in study 3, I examined the effect of status loss on the exploration/exploitation 
behavior of the organization to shed some light on the effect of another type of social 
approval assets and its dynamics on the behavior of the organization related to stability/
change dichotomy that I started in the first study and continued in the second one. Using 
data on soccer teams in the English context in a 10 year period, I found evidence on the 
positive effect of status loss on the exploration behavior of the organization relative to its 
exploitative behavior. I further examined the contingency role of celebrity and 
performance expectations of market analysts in moderating the main effect of status loss 
and found out that higher levels of both contingencies weaken the main effect of status loss 
on exploration vs. exploitation behavior of the organization. Table 5.3 summarizes the 
hypotheses and results of study 3. 
Hypothesis 2b: Securities analysts' recommendations 
moderate the relationship between firm reputation and high-
risk investments in such a way that more negative 
recommendations strengthen the negative effect of firm 
reputation on high-risk investments.
Supported
Table 5.2 Hypotheses and Results of Study 2
ResultHypotheses
Table 5.3 Hypotheses and Results of Study 3
Hypotheses Result
Hypothesis 1: Status loss is positively related to the 
exploration behavior of the organization compared to its 
exploitation behavior.
Supported
Hypothesis 2: The celebrity of the organization moderates the 
relationship between the status loss and the exploration/
exploitation of the organization such that higher levels of 
celebrity weaken the positive effect of status loss on the 
organization’s exploration behavior compared to its 
exploitation behavior.
Supported
54
Implications for Theory 
Regarding the implications for theory, as I combine theories on various social 
approval assets (i.e., reputation, status, and celebrity) and their shifts, stability-change 
interplay and its particular organizational manifestation as exploration-exploitation 
balance, and also the contingency role of external moderating factors such as securities 
analysts' recommendations and performance expectations, there are five distinct theoretical 
implications to discuss. 
First, in this dissertation I attempted on extending the current understanding of the 
outcomes of social approval assets by going beyond the dominant resource-based view 
towards the outcomes of social approval assets, and rather examine the effects of social 
approval assets on the behavior and decision making of organizations. In the first and 
second papers of this dissertation I specifically looked into the effects of reputation on the 
decision making of the firm.  
The dominant resource-based view towards the outcomes of reputation is evident in 
the literature where the most consequences of reputation have been depicted as favorable 
economic outcomes (Lange et al., 2011). I however extended the current understanding by 
investigating the effect of reputation on the degree of risk-taking of the organization that 
would determine the level of its tendency towards change or stability. As I conceptualized 
in my first paper, the path-dependancy, which is an important foundation for the reputation 
of the organization (Fombrun, 1996), leads the organization to maintain the consistency 
and predictability in its decisions and behavior over time. As reputation of an organization 
is created and maintained by the organization's showing consistent behaviors over time, 
stakeholders of the organization won't take any unpredictability in its behavior lightly 
(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). Therefore, the organization will be inclined to engage in 
more stability initiatives and less change initiatives in order to maintain the expected 
Hypothesis 3: Performance expectations of market analysts 
moderate the relationship between status loss and the 
exploration/exploitation of the organization such that higher 
levels of performance expectations weaken the positive effect 
of status loss on the organization’s exploration behavior 
compared to its exploitation behavior.
Supported
Table 5.3 Hypotheses and Results of Study 3
ResultHypotheses
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consistency and predictability. This is due to the fact that change initiatives, on the contrary 
to stability initiatives, are associated with risk taking and breaking through the status quo 
(Jansen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005). The main implication of this conceptualization 
for the theory on corporate reputation is that corporate reputation is not a mere resource 
that companies could only benefit from, but rather is a mindset that may affect the 
behavior and decision making of the organization in regard to stability and change. 
I extended this conceptualization further in my second paper, where I put it into 
empirical examination and looked into the effect of reputation on the investment decisions 
of the firm. By finding supporting findings for hypotheses stating that reputation can 
persuade the firm to pursue less risky short-term investments while dissuade them from 
pursuing riskier long-term investments, I put forth the argument that firm reputation can 
also be viewed as an organizational behavior gauge that could affect the firm’s behavior 
and decisions over time. These findings have important implications for theories related to 
the outcomes of corporate reputation by rendering a perspective in which reputation could 
bring potential dangers upon the organization. As the positive effect of reputation on 
pursuing less risky short-term investments and its negative effect on pursuing riskier long-
term investments bring a short-term orientation in the investment decisions of the 
organization, reputation may pose the threat of short-sightedness to the organization over 
time. In essence, I show how social approval assets such as reputation may foster 
managerial myopia (Levinthal and March, 1993). This sheds new light on external social 
sources of such myopia among decision-makers.  
Second, I attempted on extending literature related to the behavioral effects of changes 
in social approval assets. In that sense, the third paper has an important implication for 
studies on the possible effects of status shifts that have been only recently addressed on the 
individual level of analysis (e.g. in the work of Jensen & Kim, 2015). To that purpose, my 
third study extends that line of research on the effects of social approval assets' changes, 
and status shifts in particular, on the organizational level by investigating the effect of a 
status loss on the strategic decision making of the firm. By looking into the psychology of 
status and its possible negative shifts, I extend the idea of social approval assets as 
psychological compasses that may shape the behavior of organizations and not as mere 
resources that they will benefit from. Furthermore, the dominant resource-based view of 
the current literature towards social approval assets posits that in the aftermath of a 
negative change in such assets, organizations will be mainly deprived of the benefits that 
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naturally come with such assets. Nevertheless, the third study of my dissertation has a 
crucial implication for current theoretical understanding of the organizational effects of a 
negative shift in social approval assets by furthering the notion that such negative shifts 
have behavioral and decision making-related consequences as well. A negative shift in 
social approval, in this case status, acts as performance feedback. In theorizing this effect, I 
extend research on the behavioral theory of the firm. 
Third, by juxtaposing the simultaneous effects of multiple social approval assets and 
their shifts on the strategic decisions of the firm, I attempted on presenting a more 
comprehensive and dynamic picture of the behavioral effects of social approval assets. As 
organizations possess multiple social approval assets that are concurrently affecting the 
organizations' behavior and decision making, the findings of my third paper have important 
implications for the literature on social approval assets. Current literature tend to approach 
social approval assets separately without considering that multiple social approval assets 
and their shifts are always in concurrent play, interacting with one another, and jointly 
affecting organizational outcomes. To that purpose, by examining the simultaneous effect 
of celebrity and status loss in interacting with one another, I attempted on contributing to 
the literature by developing theories on multiple social approval assets' conjunctive 
behavioral effects on the organization. Not all approval assets are created equally, or have 
same effects when in place at the same time. Where status shifts affect performance 
expectations, celebrity and analysts' expectations affect the self-image of the firm and act 
as self-enhancing mechanisms. 
Fourth, the studies in this dissertation have a particular implication for the literature on 
stability and change, and their more operational expression of exploration/exploitation 
interplay. By investigating possession or loss of social approval assets such as reputation 
and status as the antecedents of stability and change, I broaden the current understating on 
the reasons behind the organizations' choice for either exploration or exploitation. As I 
gather from the literature, the focus has been on three major contingencies of 
environmental factors, organization's historical and structural aspects, and managerial 
biases that would influence the exploration-exploitation interplay (Jansen et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, my dissertation has an important implication as I attempted on initiating a 
new stream on the research related to exploration and exploitation by arguing that one 
important set of antecedents for exploration and exploitation is derived from the 
psychological state of organizations, prompted by possessing or losing certain social 
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approval assets. The studies in this dissertation prompt future research to consider external 
antecedents of exploratory and exploitative behavior beyond environmental drivers such as 
technological disruptions, demand shifts, and environmental uncertainty.  
Fifth, by looking at the moderating effects of various contingencies, in my dissertation 
I intend to present a better understanding of the behavioral effects of social approval assets 
by positing that salient external and internal contingencies may influence the main effect of 
social approval assets and their shifts on the organizational outcomes. As organizations 
operate in the bigger setting of their environment, the investigation of a relationship 
without considering the moderating effect of other salient factors might be misleading. Our 
findings have particularly an important implication for the signaling theory and theories on 
performance feedback as I examined the interaction between the implicit cues stemmed 
from reputation and status loss on one hand and explicit cues of performance feedback and 
analysts' recommendations on the other hand. As organizations receive various implicit and 
explicit cues in regard to their performance and favorability by their stakeholders, a 
concrete understanding of how such cues could jointly affect the strategic behavior and 
decision making of organizations will be crucial. By juxtaposing such cues in this 
dissertation and showing how those cues may affect the decision making of the 
organization via their interactions, I move a step forward in reaching that concrete 
understanding. 
Implications for Practice 
Besides the implications for theory, this dissertation has important implications for 
managerial practice as well. First, practitioners may benefit from the counter-intuitive 
discussions of this dissertation and think beyond the mere investigation of the obvious 
positive effects of a good corporate reputation or negative repercussions of a loss in their 
status for their organizations. Social approval assets has almost always been considered as 
valuable assets that provide the organization with competitive advantages (Raithel & 
Schwaiger, 2015). Consequently, managers might merely regard them as invaluable assets 
that they should possess without considering how those assets could psychologically affect 
their decision making. However, in my dissertation I particularly pinpointed that reputation 
exerts a prevention-focus upon the organization and by doing so brings a short-term 
orientation to its decision making. In that sense, reputation could become a burden by 
encouraging tactical short-term decisions at the expense of more strategic long-term ones. 
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Therefore, managers must be aware of the possible dangers that obtaining a higher 
corporate reputation may bring upon their organizations. At the same time, by highlighting 
the fact that the effect of losing social approval assets such as status may not be limited to 
simple deprivation of the organization from the advantages that are typically attached with 
possessing such social approval assets, this dissertation renders managers with a deeper 
understanding of the effects of shifts in social approval assets. This is a specifically 
important implication for managers who are concerned with the adaptation and survival of 
their organizations, as they must constantly take steps to strike a balance between 
continuous exploitation of short-term capabilities on the one hand, and exploration of 
novel and long-term competencies on the other hand (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). 
Second, managers would benefit from the findings and underlying discussions of this 
dissertation by getting a better picture of factors that could affect their exploration/
exploitation behavior. As exploring new resources and capabilities could generate potential 
tensions with exploiting existing ones (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009), it is important for 
managers to have a good understanding of the underlying psychological aspects that 
influence the organization’s exploratory/exploitative strategies.  
Finally, by presenting a better understanding of how various cues regarding 
performance and favorability of organizations may interact with one another and jointly 
affect the decision making of organizations, our findings provide managers with an 
important implication. Organizations are exposed to various implicit and explicit signals 
such as their reputation, status, celebrity, and performance expectations of market analysts. 
By examining how such cues interact with one another and how they may affect the 
decision making of managers, this dissertation presents a crucial implication for 
practitioners. 
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SUMMARY 
In this dissertation, I intend to make crucial implications to both theory and practice 
by extending and combining theories from literature on corporate reputation, status shifts, 
celebrity, performance feedback and expectations of market analysts, and exploration/
exploitation. 
Study 1 is a conceptual work that lays the foundation for the second study of my 
dissertation. The main premise of this study is that due to its path-dependent nature, 
corporate reputation may be a promoter of stability initiatives and at the same time a 
demoter of change initiatives. Building upon previous literature, I propose that reputable 
firms are expected to stick to more familiar initiates over time in order to maintain stability 
and the trust of their stakeholders. I then look into the contingencies that may affect this 
main relationship. 
In study 2, I investigated how corporate reputation may have a significant effect on the 
investment decisions of the firm. Using a panel dataset of 128 firms from various 
industries, our results from this study show that higher levels of reputation encourage the 
firm to embark upon more low-risk investments and less high-risk investments. 
Furthermore, I looked into the contingency role of securities analysts' recommendations in 
moderating the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions of the firm. In that 
regard, I found evidence on the strengthening effect of negative recommendations on the 
main relationship between reputation and investment decisions. 
Finally, in study 3, I examined the effect of status loss on the exploration/exploitation 
behavior of the organization to shed some light on the effect of another type of social 
approval assets and its dynamics on the behavior of the organization related to stability/
change dichotomy that I started in the first study and continued in the second one. Using 
data on soccer teams in the English context in a 10 year period, I found evidence on the 
positive effect of status loss on the exploration behavior of the organization relative to its 
exploitative behavior. I further examined the contingency role of celebrity and 
performance expectations of market analysts in moderating the main effect of status loss 
and found out that higher levels of both contingencies weaken the main effect of status loss 
on exploration vs. exploitation behavior of the organization. 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY)  
In dit proefschrift wil ik komen tot belangrijke implicaties voor zowel de theorie als de 
praktijk door theorieën uit de literatuur over bedrijfsreputatie, statusverschuivingen, 
populariteit, prestatiefeedback, verwachtingen van marktanalisten en exploratie/exploitatie 
aan te vullen en met elkaar te combineren. 
Studie 1 is een conceptueel werk waarin de basis wordt gelegd voor de tweede studie 
van mijn proefschrift. Het belangrijkste uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek is dat de reputatie 
van een onderneming door zijn padafhankelijke aard stabiliteitsinitiatieven kan bevorderen 
en tegelijkertijd veranderingsinitiatieven kan tegengaan. Voortbouwend op eerdere 
literatuur stel ik dat verwacht mag worden dat gerenommeerde bedrijven in de loop van de 
tijd zullen kiezen voor meer vertrouwde initiatieven met het oog op het behoud van 
stabiliteit en het vertrouwen van hun stakeholders. Vervolgens kijk ik naar de onvoorziene 
factoren die van invloed kunnen zijn op deze hoofdrelatie. 
In studie 2 heb ik onderzocht hoe de reputatie van een bedrijf een significant effect 
kan hebben op de beleggingsbeslissingen van het bedrijf. Aan de hand van een 
paneldataset van 128 bedrijven uit verschillende bedrijfstakken, blijkt uit onze 
studieresultaten dat een hoger reputatieniveau bedrijven stimuleert om meer investeringen 
met een laag risico te doen en minder met een hoog risico. Verder heb ik gekeken naar de 
contingente rol van aanbevelingen van effectenanalisten bij het modereren van het 
hoofdeffect van reputatie op de beleggingsbeslissingen van het bedrijf. In dat opzicht vond 
ik bewijs voor het versterkende effect van negatieve aanbevelingen op de belangrijkste 
relatie tussen reputatie en investeringsbeslissingen. 
Tot slot heb ik in studie 3 onderzocht wat het effect is van statusverlies op het 
exploratie- en exploitatiegedrag van de organisatie, met als doel om meer duidelijkheid te 
krijgen over het effect van een ander type sociale waardering en de dynamiek ervan op het 
gedrag van de organisatie met betrekking tot de dichotomie stabiliteit/verandering 
waarmee ik begon in de eerste studie en waarmee ik verder ging in de tweede. Met behulp 
van gegevens over voetbalteams in de Engelse context over een periode van tien jaar, vond 
ik bewijs voor het positieve effect van statusverlies op het exploratiegedrag van de 
organisatie ten opzichte van het exploitatieve gedrag. Verder onderzocht ik de contingente 
rol van populariteit en prestatieverwachtingen van markanalisten bij het modereren van het 
hoofdeffect van statusverlies. Het bleek dat een hogere mate van beide contingente 
factoren het hoofdeffect van statusverlies op het exploratie- versus exploitatiegedrag van 
de organisatie verzwakt. 
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firm is investigated. Using a panel dataset of 128 firms from various industries, our results from this study 
show that higher levels of reputation encourage the firm to embark upon more low-risk investments  
and less high-risk investments. 
Finally, in study 3, the effect of status loss on the exploration/exploitation behavior of the organization  
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